The Election Integrity Task Force (EITF) is a rapid response mechanism designed to detect and prevent foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and other malicious influence operations, including domestic ones (DIMI), during election periods. Initiated in 2025, this consortium is led by Global Media Registry (GMR), in partnership with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and Fondation Hirondelle. Launched in October 2025 in the context of the presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire, the EITF was then implemented in Bangladesh in February 2026 and finally in Peru ahead of the presidential election in April.
Christopher Acosta, member of the local partner organization of the EITF in Peru the Instituto Prensa y Sociedad (IPYS), and Albertina Piterbarg, consultant and trainer during the project, reflect on the implementation of the EITF in Peru.
This interview was conducted on May 20, 2026, before the conclusion of the elections in Peru.
Can you present briefly the objective of this project and your role in this partnership ?
Christopher : As part of this project, IPYS, in partnership with Fondation Hirondelle, has trained journalists in Peru about detecting FIMI. It’s a new concept for us here. I guess this is the first time that a group of journalists, who came from Lima and regions, as well as people of civil organizations followed a training on this concept. Now, we are in a very controversial election, ending in three weeks with the second round.
Albertina : The EITF is critical in this time. Indeed, we are very much immersed in our own country political issues and it is a difficult exercise to understand that some political narratives affecting decisions at a local or national level are being manipulated by external forces. It’s not a natural way of seeing things, especially during elections, which are periods when you are usually not paying too much attention to what’s being discussed all over the world. FIMI campaigns can influence national politics directly or indirectly when artificially amplified narratives, such as for example those targeting the LGBTQIA+ community, shape national or regional political debates.
How to identify FIMI ? And what is the difference from what we call disinformation?
Albertina : Sometimes FIMI and disinformation are understood as equivalent but many of the narratives of FIMI strategies are not necessarily disinformation. What’s important to understand is that FIMI is not about if the content is true or false. It is a more complex and expensive process in which real information can be used to influence an agenda and shape people’s perceptions of a topic. It involves a systematic methodology, very expensive to produce and very expensive to detect with a teamwork, knowing a lot about technical and technology issues.
This methodology, involving open source investigation, was born with the 2022 invasion of by Russia of Ukraine and has been codified and developed by the European Union to categorize some campaigns as « FIMI campaigns ». It requires to analyze the narratives, which technology is used to disseminate them, what are the effects and impacts of these narratives, who are the main actors involved and what are the main objectives of the campain.
Christopher : One of the key lessons we learned from these trainings is that, while much information comes from abroad, it can only be described as FIMI if there is evidence of intent, coordinated channels, and actors seeking to influence the country politics. The training helped us, as journalists, to clarify how to detect when we are talking about FIMI or not. As I said, FIMI is still a new concept for us, but the closest comparison may be disinformation campaigns, which we can already identify in our electoral processes. Even during the current electoral campaign, we have seen local actors trying to influence people on social media through fake news and false information. One candidate who lost in the first round invested significant resources to convince people that the results were fraudulent. As journalists, the challenge we face is how to deal with these campaigns, identify where the information comes from, and assess whether the sources are reliable.
What’s interesting also is that the project brought together an international framework and local implementing partner. How did you navigate to balance between global methodologies and local realities on the ground in Peru ?
Albertina: The methodology is composed of a series of indicators to estimate and understand the information circulating. Even though the methodology was developed by the European Union, it can still be applied anywhere, because it is quite neutral and does not include anything that would really limit its use in other contexts. Adapting that methodology to your local context will depend a lot on your resources : if you have the hardware, software, a team of fact checkers… Detecting FIMI demands to work in a network. For instance there recently was a detection of a FIMI campaign directed against the president of Argentina : this was the result of a team effort of different organizations all over the world, not the work of one person with his or her computer.
Christopher : Moreover, the challenge is not only how to adapt the concept locally, but also how to combine the FIMI methodology with a journalistic approach, since FIMI methodology initially comes more from the security sector. It also requires specific technical skills, while journalists have their own methods and ways of working. But, as Albertina said, we are not asking journalists to produce a broad diagnosis of FIMI in Peru; instead, we are working with small journalistic pieces that help bring this new concept into our local context, which has been a very valuable experience for us.
Albertina : Indeed, I think the main value of these trainings and activities is to make journalists aware of FIMI, rather than expecting them to start monitoring it themselves. Ojo Pùblico did launch a monitoring process, but as a journalist, you mainly need to know that FIMI exists so that, when analysing issues such as changes to abortion laws or women’s political participation, you can consider whether external influence campaigns may have played a role and provide a more complete analysis of the local situation. Journalists may also take part in international monitoring initiatives, so there are different ways for them to engage, but I would say the first step is simply to be aware of this issue.
What gives you hope ? Are there signs that the fight against FIMI is gaining ground in Latin America ?
Christopher : Yes, I have repeated this many times, but this topic is still very new for us. Even for journalists working on international news, FIMI is not really identified at all. As Albertina said, this first step, that journalists now know that FIMI exists and how it works, is already enough for us. And now Peru is becoming the centre of a kind of Cold War between China and the United States in Latin America, because of a major port here and investments from both countries. Maybe at some point, all the information we have learned with Albertina and the Foundation Hirondelle here in Peru will be very useful to identify whether Peru has been, or is becoming, the centre of a FIMI case.
Albertina:What gives me hope is seeing that pre-bunking these campaigns can have a real impact. It is a very encouraging to do this in Latin America, because this methodology is useful not only to react to campaings but also to help prevent what might happen. This is a very important part of the FIMI methodology: if you look at what happened in Moldova and Hungary during their electoral processes, you can see that disinformation and FIMI campaigns were less impactful than before. And this did not happen by chance; it is the result of a lot of work in this area.
To learn more about our project on gouvernance and democratic processes, consult the dedicated page.